The Sixth Circuit Rules an Employer Violated Title VII by Terminating its Transgender Employee

By R. Joseph Stennis, Jr.

On March 7, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court decision and ruled in favor of a transgender employee who claimed she was terminated by her employer based on her sex pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Aimee Stephens, formerly known as Anthony Stephens, worked as a funeral director at R.G. and G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.  The funeral home had a dress code policy, requiring male employees to wear suits and female employees to wear skirts and business jackets.  The funeral home provided free suits to the male employees, but did not (at least initially) provide female employees with any clothing to comply with the company’s dress code policy.  Stephens informed the funeral home that she would be transitioning from male to female and therefore would begin to dress to be in compliance with the company’s dress code for females.  Shortly thereafter,

The Cold Hard Facts

By Michael D. Hornback

A recent Kentucky Court of Appeals decision is a reminder of a litigation truism –  there is no such thing as a “motion to change the facts.” Admittedly, I have handled numerous cases over the years wherein I wished, hoped and even prayed that I could file such a motion.  Much to my chagrin, a “motion to change the facts” is not available.  However, don’t despair because plaintiffs also find themselves wishing they could change the facts.  As the Kentucky Court of Appeals recently found, the “cold hard facts” are what they are, and a plaintiff’s subjective beliefs about the reason for her termination won’t carry the day.

In Conley v. Mountain Comprehensive Care Center, Inc., 2017 WL 3129215 (Ky. App., July 21, 2017), a licensed clinical social worker was terminated and sued her employer claiming age discrimination.  This case stems from Ms. Conley’s preparation and submission of a therapeutic treatment plan for a foster child directly to the Perry County Family Court, rather than to the Department for Community Based Services (“DCBS”).  It should be noted that Ms. Conley’s therapeutic treatment plan was apparently in conflict with